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Introduction  
i.1. The Aim and Tasks 
The aim of this work is to develop novel approaches to constructing and modelling 
dependable Web Services (WSs) built out of Web Components that can be undependable. To 
achieve this aim we have been working on the following tasks: 
● Analysing the WS failures modes and introducing a failure taxonomy; 
● Analysing Web security as an attribute of WS dependability; 
● Investigating a structured approach to the Web Service development that is based the 
Web Service Composition Actions (WSCA) scheme; 
● Proposing an event-driven simulation model of the Composite WSs; 
● Analysing the WS upgrading problem and developing schemes for WSs online upgrade; 
● Outlining future directions of WSCA-based systems development focusing specifically 
on the means for dependability achievement and assessment. 
i.2. Structure of the Report 
This report consists of three parts and five sections.  
Section 1 introduces the Web Service architecture, attributes of Web Service dependability 
and the general problem of dependable Web Services development. A structured approach to 
the Web Service development based on the Web Service Composition Action technique 
developed earlier is proposed in section 2. Section 3 describes our approach to the Composite 
Web Services modelling and obtained simulation results. Section 4 describes solutions to 
solve problem of online Web Services upgrading. In Section 5 we propose actual approaches 
to Web Services development and measuring of the WSs dependability.  
i.3. Glossary  
WS – web service;  
CtWS – composite web service;  
CnWS – component web service; 
CA-actions – coordinated atomic actions;  
WSCA – web service composition action; 
NA – nested action; 
OTS components - off-the-shelves components; 
AR – arrived request (request arriving from the users to the WS); 
DS – dedicated server; 
RMD – radial metrics diagram. 
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1. Web Services and Dependability  
1.1. On Web Services Architectures 
The Web Service architecture [Ferguson et al 2003] is rapidly becoming a de facto standard 
environment for achieving interoperability between different software applications running 
on a variety of platforms. This architecture supports development and deployment of open 
systems in which component discovery and system integration can be postponed until the 
systems are executed. The individual components (i.e. Web Services – WSs) advertise their 
services via a registry (typically developed using the UDDI standard1) in which their 
descriptions, given in a standard XML-based language called Web Service Definition 
Language (WSDL2), can be looked up. After a WS capable of delivering the required service, 
has been found it can be used or even dynamically integrated into a Composite WS. 
Developing the WS architecture is in effect a further step in the evolution of the well-known 
component-based system development techniques supporting the integration of the off-the-
shelves (OTS) components. The main advances enabling this architecture have been made by 
the standardisation of the integration process (of a set of interrelated standards such as 
SOAP, WSDL, UDDI, etc.). WSs are the OTS components for which a standard way of 
advertising their functionality has been widely adopted.  
The WS architecture is now extensively used in developing various critical applications such 
as banking, auctions, internet shopping, hotel/car/flight/train reservation and booking, e-
business, e-science, business account management. This is why ensuring dependability in 
this architecture is an emerging area of research and development [Ferguson et al 2003], 
[Tartanoglu et al 2003].  
The challenge here is posed by the specific characteristics of this architecture, including its 
openness, heterogeneity of components and platforms, asynchronous nature of 
communication and autonomy of components. In addition to that, the components to be 
integrated are ready-made black boxes of unknown quality, which belong to different 
organizations and are outside of the control of the systems using them.  
Dependable WS composition is an emerging area of research. Paper [Tartanoglu et al 2003] 
analyses several existing approaches to incorporating fault tolerance measures (including 
both, backward and forward error recovery mechanisms) into the Composite WS. 
                                                 
1 http://www.uddi.org/ 
2 http://www.w3.org/TR/wsdl 
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1.2. Analysis of the Web Service Failures 
The web service dependability consists of several constituents. First of all these are: 
reliability, security, performance/responsiveness. For the e-commerce, in particular, the 
serviceability describing the user’s satisfaction and the availability of the required services is 
an important characteristics.  
Performance and responsiveness undoubtedly are the important characteristics, but it is easy 
to provide them using the parallel computing (web-cluster) and hardware upgrading (but this 
is outside of the scope of this report). In this section we will focus on web service reliability 
and security which are very challenging problems. 
We have developed a new failure taxonomy (Fig.1.1) to be used in analysing possible web 
service failures by studying the existing work [Avizienis et al 2002], [Chandra et al 2000], 
[Deswarte et al 1998]. This taxonomy differs from the work [Chandra et al 2000], [Deswarte 
et al 1998] that views the failures of the WSs from the point of view of the developers and 
the end-users. Our classification will help in defining the necessary fault-tolerance means for 
specific failure modes. 
This taxonomy allows us to define all possible failures modes. which are shown on the 
Fig. 1.2 as a failure mode graph. This graph can be presented as a matrix (see Table 1.1). Its 
columns correspond to the different graph paths. The symbol “1” at the intersection of i-th 
row and j-th column of matrix means that the i-th classification attribute is applied for the j-th 
failure mode. 
The simulation model of the Composite Web Service (see section 4) can be refined taking 
into account the modes of failures and the possible fault-tolerance techniques. Note that the 
proposed taxonomy does not specifically address the problems of WS security, which is 
clearly a very important area of R&D. 
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Fig. 1.2. Failure mode graph 
 
 
Table 1.1. Matrix of the failure modes  
Failure modes Failure 
classification 
criteria 
Failure mode classification attributes 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 
Environment-dependent failures 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1                  Failure 
dependence Application-specific failures                                                       1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   1 1 1
Hardware (HW) environment 1 1 1 1 1                                                                   
Operation System (OS)      1 1 1 1 1 1 1                                                         
Web-server                1 1 1 1 1 1 1                                           
Application  
server                              1 1 1 1 1 1 1                             
Software 
(SW) 
environment
Software 
services 
DBMS                                            1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1                  
Servlets and CGI applications                                                       1 1 1 1 1 1 1           
Failure source 
Application 
software DB stored procedures and triggers                                                              1 1 1 1 1 1  1
Permanent      1 1 1        1 1 1         1 1 1         1 1 1 1          1 1 1 1 11            Stability of 
occurrence Transient 1 1 1 1 1    1 1 1 1       1 1 1 1       1 1 1 1         1 1 1 1 1    1 1 1 1      1 1 1 1
HW environment 1 1                                                                            
SW environment 1     1   1                                                                     Crash of  
DB stored 
procedures                                                  1         1                  
Operation System  1 1 1   1   1                                                                   
SW service                  1 1     1 1   1 1     1 1   1 1       1 1                   Suspension 
of  Application 
software                    1       1     1       1     1         1    1 1 1 1           
Stored data 1                                                 1         1                  
Halt of  
Web-system
Loss of 
Session data 1 1 1               1 1     1 1   1 1     1 1   1 1 1     1 1 1   1 1 1 1           
Influence on 
system and its 
components 
No pernicious influence    1 1   1    1 1 1     1 1     1     1 1     1       1 1      1 1 1 1 1 1 1       1 1 1
Replacement of crashed HW components 1 1                                                                            
Reinstall of SW components 1     1   1                                         1         1                  
Stored data 1     1   1                                         1         1                  Recovery of Session data 1 1 1   1 1  1 1       1 1     1 1   1 1     1 1   1 1 1     1 1 1   1       1        
OS   1    1   1                                                                   
Software services                  1 1     1 1   1 1     1 1   1 1       1 1                   Restart of 
Application software                    1       1     1       1     1         1    1       1        
Means for  
failure effect 
recovery  
No special means    1 1   1    1 1 1     1 1     1     1 1     1       1 1      1 1 1 1 1 1 1       1 1 1
Redundancy of HW environment 1 1 1 1    1    1   1 1 1 1   1 1 1 1 1 1   1 1 1 1 1 1     1 1 1                  
Replication of SW environment  1 1 1 1                                                                          
Data replication 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1         1   1 1 1   1 1 1 1 1   1 1 1 1 1   1 1 1  1   1     1   
Diversity of SW environment         1    1   1 1 1 1   1 1 1 1 1 1   1 1 1 1 1 1 1   1 1 1                  
Diversity of application software                                                              1 1 1 1     1     1   
Operation retry with rollback recovery block
(time redundancy)     1         1         1             1               1            1          1
Fault-tolerance 
means 
Application specific error exception 
handling                                                             1    1   1    1     
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1.3. Web Security as an Attribute of WS Dependability 
Security is one of the most important characteristics of WSs and it should be addressed 
during the design and implementation of the components of the WS architecture. A key 
benefit of the emerging WS architecture is the ability to deliver interoperable solutions. 
Ensuring the integrity, confidentiality and security of Web Services through the application 
of a comprehensive security model is critical, both for organizations and their customers. 
IBM, Microsoft, and other companies have proposed several new specifications3 to provide 
the foundation upon which the secure interoperable Web Services can be established:  
● WS-Security Policy provides a framework for defining security, privacy, and other 
policies on machines involved in Web Services transactions.  
● WS-Privacy implements privacy policies that WS-Security Policy defines and lets Web 
Services providers and users state privacy preferences and practices.  
● WS-Trust provides a framework of models for establishing both direct and brokered trust 
relationships for secure Web Services interoperation.  
● WS-Authorization defines how Web Services manage authorization policies.  
Web service security is expansive direction especially in the area of e-commerce application. 
Providing security policy in e-commerce can be divided into two directions: reducing the 
risks of resource provider and of the customer. 
The main customer’s risks are: 
● threat of disclosure of private data (name, address, credit card number etc) by violator; 
● threat of payment for non-booked services ordered by violator through wiretapping and 
modification of transferred requests.  
Owner’s risks include: 
● wiretapping of confidential information by violator; 
● getting an access to the confidential information (reading and modification) by violator; 
● getting an access to unpaid service or to the service more expensive than one was paid; 
● customer demands a repayment after service utilization because allegedly hi booked 
nothing.  
                                                 
3 Security in a Web Services World: A Proposed Architecture and Roadmap  
// A joint security whitepaper from IBM Corporation and Microsoft Corporation. April 7, 2002, Version 1.0.  
http://www-106.ibm.com/developerworks/library/ws-secmap/ws-secmap.pdf 
 8
The threats mentioned above can be tolerated by using various existing techniques and means 
(see Table 1.2).  
Table 1.2. Security guard means 
Security guard means 
Access rights 
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Data 
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Organization 
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Security threats 
O
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Threat of disclosure of private data (name, 
ddress, credit card number, etc.) by violator a 1 1   1 Customer
risks  
 Threat of payment for non-booked services 
ordered by violator through wiretapping and 
modification of transferred requests 
  1 1   
Wiretapping of confidential information by 
violator   1     
Getting an access to the confidential information 
(reading and modification) by violator 1     1 
Getting an access to unpaid service or to the 
service more expensive than one was paid 1   1   
Owner’s 
risks 
Customer demands a repayment after service 
utilization because allegedly hi booked nothing     1   
The implementation of the mentioned means for the Composite Web Services has certain 
features. For example, the encoding methods can be implemented in the following way: 
1. Different encoding methods (or one method with different secure keys) will be used for 
data encryption at the different levels of Composite Web Service. It will be beneficial to 
employ the cluster (multi-server) architecture of Composite WS, when each composite 
service runs at the distinct (maybe remote) server. But in this case the number of potential 
points for unauthorized access or document’s integrity damage is increasing. So the use 
of this variant of encoding decreases the probability of decoding. 
2. Different methods or the same methods of encoding (or one method with different secure 
keys) may be used for each Component WS. If the violator has decoded the data of one 
composite (or he has received the secure key) he will not able to decode the data of other 
Composite WS because it use the other encoding method (or secure key). 
Besides, within the Composite Web Services the access methods also can be improved. As a 
rule, the checking of the user’s permissions executed once per session when hi registers at the 
system (or enters into the document space). But we have to remember such variant of user 
behavior when it seems that he is going to get the resource “A” but really he tries to get an 
access to the resource “B”. In other words, the registered user tries to get the resources 
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having no permissions for them. To prevent such situation the authorization system has to 
control the permissions not at user login but at the each level of Composite Web Service. 
Accordingly, we have to conduct the analysis and elaborate the information about the 
characteristics of the different threats, intrusions upon the Composite Web Service and its 
components to develop and introduce the services of monitoring for independent information 
processing. 
2. On Dependable Web Service Composition  
2.1. Web Service Composition Actions  
In our previous work we have developed a structured approach to the composition of Web 
Services [Tartanoglu et al 2003]. Web Service Composition Actions (WSCA) allow 
Composite WSs to be structured in terms of coordinated atomic actions (CA-actions) [Xu et 
al 1995] that have a well-defined behaviour, both in the absence and in the presence of 
service failures. This scheme supports forward error recovery by cooperative exception 
handling as the main means of providing fault tolerance. It relies on recursive system 
structuring during the system integration and allows each action to deliver a number of 
outcomes. When an exceptional outcome is reported all responsibility for the recovery is 
transferred to the higher level of in the system structure (the containing WSCA action). 
2.2. Structured Approach to Web Service Development  
2.2.1. Elements of the Approach 
The structured approach we are putting forward is based on the development of a Composite 
Web Service as a system built as a multilevel hierarchy with regular and nested recursive 
structure. The basic principles of the structured approach are as follow: 
1. 
2. 
Requests (ARs), arriving from the users to the Composite WS are the WSCAs at the top 
level of the hierarchy. There are several types of ARs to be processed by the Composite 
WS. Each of these requests is composed of several nested actions (NAs). The type of 
partial AR (WSCA, in the general case) depends on the number and the types of the 
nested actions. In turn, each of the NAs is a WSCA of the adjacent lower level, which 
also can be decomposed in several NAs, and so on as shown in Fig.2.1. 
The Composite Web Service has a multilevel structure (Fig.2.2), which, as a whole, 
coincides with the WSCA nesting scheme. The Composite WS is a “white box”. It 
contains a number of Component Web Services (Component WS) that process separate 
parts of the arriving requests (i.e. a set of nested WSCAs). From this viewpoint on a 
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Composite WS any of the Component WSs is a “black box”. However, the Component 
WS inside also can be treated as a “white box” which in turn is composed of a number of 
Component Web Services at the next lower decomposition layer, and so on. Thus, at any 
decomposition level we can consider two alternative views on the  structure: the “white 
box” one (j-th Composite WS of i-th level) and several “black boxes” (set of Component 
WS related to the i,j-th Composite WS), i.e. a Composite Web Service is structured in 
both the vertical and the horizontal directions, as shown in Fig. 2.2.  
WSCA 1,1
Nesting Scheme of Web Services Composition Actions
WSCA 2,1 WSCA 2,2   WSCA 2,n2-1
...
WSCA k,1 WSCA k,2 WSCA k,nk-2 WSCA k,nk-1WSCA k,3 ...
...
kth level
2th level
1th level
WSCA 2,n2
WSCA k,nk
WSCA 1,n1...Arrived Request of 1-th type Arrived Request of n1-th type
Fig. 2.1. WSCA nesting scheme 
. . .
. . .. . .
Composite Web Service
. . .
. . . ComponentWS 2,n2
Component
WS 2,2
Component WS 2,1
Composite WS 2,1
Composite WS 3,1 Composite WS 1,n3
  Component
WS k,1
Component WS 3,1 Component WS 3,n3
  Component
WS k,i
  Component
WS k,j
  Component
WS k,nk
External
resources and services
User Requests Answers
WSCA1,i Answer(WSCA1,i)
1th level
2th level
3th level
kth level
DBs
DBs
Fig. 2.2. Structure of Composite Web Service 
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3. 
4. 
Generally, the Component WSs at the bottom of the hierarchy are the pre-developed 
services with known or predicted characteristics (reliability, security, dependability in 
general). New web services are built by various compositions out of these Component 
WSs. A partial Component WS is described by its functionality, i.e., realised function 
{FCnWS}, and a set of metrics {MetCnWS} which characterise this function (its reliability, 
security, execution time, etc.). A Component WS produces results VCnWS of two main 
types: a) success (Sc), b) failure (Fl). In some cases, a partial result (Pt) also can by 
provided as it is spelled out later. 
The value ViCnWS ∈ {Sc, Fl} depends on the values of the metrics {FiCnWS} and the 
individual parameters of the processed WSCA. The behaviour of a Component WS may 
in some cases depend on time as well.  
To process WSCAs a Composite WS executes a number of corresponding operations by 
invoking one or several Component WSs and analysing their results. Inside a Composite 
WS there three types of results returned by a WSCA are defined VCpWS ∈ {Nr, Pt, Fl}:  
a) if all of the nested actions of a WSCA are processed successfully by the set of the 
Component WSs, then VCpWS = Nr; 
b) if not all of the nested actions of a WSCA are processed successfully, then 
VCpWS = Pt; 
c) if all of the nested actions of a WSCA are processed with failures, then VCpWS = Fl. 
The third type of result which can be returned by a WSCA, called here ‘partial result’ 
depends on:  
a) the type and the individual parameters of the processed WSCA; 
b) the dependability characteristics of the Composite WSs  
c) the dependability characteristics of all the Component WSs involved in the 
processing of WSCA nested actions.  
During the development of a Composite Web Service, the designer decides which of the 
Component WSs to use depending on their functionality, dependability and other 
characteristics (such as performance, cost and time of development). The overall structure of 
the Composite Web Service will be defined by its granularity. 
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2.2.2. Ensuring Fault-Tolerance and Dependability 
The WSCA concept for tolerating faults is based on an application specific exception 
handling of two types: internal (i.e. inside the Component WS) and external (which require 
cooperative handling at the level of the Composite WS) exception handling. 
Besides, the dependability of the Composite Web Service may also be ensured by the 
following means: 
• degree of redundancy of the WSCAs taking into account their characteristics; 
• development technique of the Component and the Composite WS with the required 
functionality and dependability;  
• development of special procedures supporting tolerance by the basic elements of the 
Composite WS to different failures (design, physical, interaction; software, hardware, 
malicious, etc); 
• application of different kinds of redundancy, diversity on the different levels of 
Composite WS hierarchy. 
3. Modelling of the Composite Web Services Dependability 
3.1. A General Approach to Modelling  
3.1.1. General Model Description 
We use a two-level WSCA-based approach for the Composite WS modelling. At the first 
level, we have a Composite WS which processes the input request stream and returns 
answers to the answer stream. The arriving requests (WSCAs of first level) are decomposed 
into a number of nested WSCAs (WSCAs of first level). These nested WSCAs are then 
processed by the corresponding Component WSs.  
The logical subsystem (Fig.3.1) of the simulation model defines the set of ARs to be 
processed by the Composite WS, the set of the nested WSCAs on which each of the ARs can 
be decomposed, and the set of the Component WSs that process the defined type of nested 
WSCAs.  
The physical subsystem (Fig.3.2) of the simulation model defines a relationship between the 
logical model and the overall hardware architecture.  
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Requests stream
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...
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WSCA1
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Fig. 3.1. Logical model of Composite Web-Service 
Dedicated Servers
Dedicated Server1
Main ServerRequests stream
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Component
WS1
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WSCA2
 WSCAm
 
Answer(AR i-th type)
 
Component
WS2
1th Level
2th Level
Result(WSCA1,WSCA2 )
Result(WSCAm)
Main Web-Server
 
Fig. 3.2. Physical model of Composite Web-Service 
Each Component WS that processes only WSCAs of a specified type may be executed on a 
Dedicated Server (DS). In case, when all WSCAs are processed in parallel on different DSs 
the better throughput can be achieved. In other cases when several Component WSs are 
executed on the same server, WSCAs are processed in a parallel-sequential mode. The 
application logic of the Composite WS can affect the mode of request execution as well. 
The failures are simulated in the following way. At the second level of the model, the failures 
are represented as the situations in which the Component WS cannot deliver the service 
requested by WSCA cased by the following: 
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a) hardware faults; 
b) software faults; 
c) application-specific situations when Component WS cannot satisfy the WSCA 
requirements. 
In case of failure, the Component WS catches an exception and activates the error handling 
mechanism. As a result of error handling some of the failures will be tolerated inside the 
Component WS. The Composite WS will not even know about them (encapsulation of the 
internal behaviour).  
Thus, for the nested WSCA, which is processed by a Component WS two outcomes are 
possible: 
a) the WSCA is processed successfully (including the situations, when a failure occurred 
but was tolerated inside of Component WS). Component WS returns a normal result back 
to the Composite WS.  
b) the WSCA is processed with a failure not tolerated by the error handling inside of the 
Component WS. In this case, the Component WS raises an exception to the Composite 
WS.  
The failures at the top level of the model include the exceptions propagated by the 
Component WSs as well as the exceptions raised by the Composite WS itself when it detects 
own errors. These failures can also be tolerated using the error handling by the Composite 
WS. When the Composite WS fails to deliver the service required by an AR, it reports an 
exceptional outcome to the answer stream. 
3.1.2. Specification of the Composite WS Simulation Model  
1. There are several types of requests { }niiARAR 1==  to be processed by the Composite WS. 
The arriving requests can be decomposed into several nested WSCAs of different type 
. The type of the AR defines the number and the types of the nested 
WSCAs.  
{ }m
jj
WSCAWSCA
1==
●  is a set of variables that specify the probabilities of AR of i-th type.  { }niarriPar 1=
● Matrix ARxWSCA specifies the correspondence between the ARs and the WSCAs. 
The rows of this matrix are the set of ARs of different type. The columns are the 
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WSCAs of different type. The symbol “1” at the intersection of i-th row and j-th 
column means that the j-th WSCAs is a part of AR of i-th type. 
● The following variables specify the probabilities of various outcomes for each AR: 
o  - AR of i-th type processed with no failures (all of the nested WSCAs 
are processed successfully including the situations, when a failure occurred but 
was tolerated inside the Component WSs);  
1−succ
iarP
o  - AR of i-th type is processed with failures (one or several of nested 
WSCAs are processed with failures which were not tolerated inside the 
Component WSs), but the Composite WS tolerated them;  
2−succ
iPar
o  - AR of i-th type is erroneous (fully or partial) despite the error handling 
at both the Composite and the Component levels. The values of these variables 
depend on the AR type and on the outcomes of WSCAs on which a partial AR is 
decomposed. 
err
iPar
● is a set of variables which specify the mean time of successful processing 
of AR of i-th type. The values of these variables depend on the AR type, the 
outcomes of the WSCAs, on which the AR is decomposed, and the overall system 
architecture (in particular, on the available number of the Dedicated Servers). 
{ nisucciTcr 1=}
● is a set of variables which specify the additional time which a Composite 
WS spends on exception handling of AR of i-th type when failures are detected. 
{ }niexciTcr 1=
2.  is a set of Component WSs that are used by the Composite WS to 
provide the required service. Each of Component WSs processes one of the nested 
WSCAs of a certain type.  
{ }m
jj
CnWSCnWS
1==
● The following variables specify the probabilities of different outcomes for each 
Component WS:  is the probability that a Component WS of j-th type 
processes the corresponding WSCA without a failure;  - is the probability 
that a failure occurs during WSCA processing but it is tolerated inside the Component 
WS of j-th type; and  - is the probability that a non-tolerated failure occurs.  
1−succ
jPcnws
err
jPcnws
2−succ
jPcnws
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● is a set of variables which specify the normal execution time for the 
Component WS of j-th type.  
{ m
j
succ
jTcnws 1=}
}●  is the set of variables which specify the additional time which a 
Component WS of j-th type spends on exception handling of a WSCA when a failure 
is detected. 
{ m
j
exc
jTcnws 1=
4. There is a set of Dedicated Servers { }skkDSDS 1== , each of which can serve one or several 
Component WSs.  
● A matrix DS*CnWS specifies the correspondence between the dedicated servers and the 
Component WSs. Its rows correspond to the set of DSs. The columns are the Component 
WSs of different type. The symbol “1” at the intersection of k-th row and j-th column 
means that the k-th dedicated server serves the j-th Component WSs. 
3.2. Application of the General Model  
In this section we demonstrate how the general model developed in section 3.1 can be 
instantiated and used for a specific target environment. 
3.2.1. Assumptions and their Foundation 
We simulate a specific behaviour of a Composite Web Service under the following 
assumptions: 
● the failures of the Component WSs occur when Component WSs fail to deliver the 
services that WSCAs require;  
● these failures can be tolerated inside the Component WSs by the error handling. The 
probability of tolerating errors is given for each of the Component WSs; 
● the time of error handling is equal to the normal (with no failures) execution time of the 
Component WS; 
● when the Component WS cannot tolerate a failure, it reports an exception up to the 
Composite WS; 
● the failures of the Composite WS are reported as exceptions propagated by them;  
● the probability with which the Composite WS can tolerate these failures is proportional to 
the ratio between the number of nested WSCAs processed without failures by the 
Component WSs and the total number of nested WSCAs;  
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● the time of error handling executed by the Composite WS is equal to the normal (with no 
failures) execution time of the arrived request; 
● when the Composite WS cannot tolerate these failures, it reports an exceptional outcome 
to the answer stream. 
3.2.2. Scheme of the Model and its Operation 
An event-driven simulation model (Fig. 3.3) of the Composite WS was developed to analyse 
its overall performance as a function of the number and characteristics of the Component 
WSs.  
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Fig. 3.3. Composite WS simulation schema 
The model is developed using the M-File programming and simulated in the MATLAB 6.0 
environment.  
The input data and settings for the simulation are: 
● CnCount is the number of WSCAs of different types (equal to the number of the 
Component WSs processing them); 
● ReqCount is the number of different types of requests; 
● ServCount is the number of DSs on which the Component WSs can be deployed; 
● PCn[1..CnCount, 1..3] is a matrix which specifies the probabilities of different outcomes 
of processing a WSCA (failure free, tolerated failure and non-tolerated failure) for each 
of the Component WSs; 
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● TCn[1..CnCount] is an array which specifies the execution time of processing a WSCA 
without failures for each of the Component WSs, in seconds; 
● MReq[1..ReqCount, 1..CnCount]  is a matrix which specifies the set of arriving requests; 
● PReq[1..ReqCount] is an array which specifies the probabilities of arrival of the requests 
of each type; 
● MServ[1..ServCount, 1..CnCount] is an array which specifies the set of DSs. 
The simulation data and the recorded results are as follows: 
● ReqNo is the type of the current arriving request (1..ReqCount); 
● TReq is the execution time for the arriving request, in seconds; 
● CnOut[1..CnCount] is an array which specifies the processing result of the nested 
WSCAs initiated by the arriving request: 
o “0” – this WSCA is not executed (the arriving request does not require the WSCA);  
o “1” – WSCA executes without failures; 
o “2” – WSCA executes with a failure but is tolerated by the error handling mechanism 
of the Component WS; 
o “3” – WSCA executes with a failure which is not tolerated. 
● ReqOut presents the detailed processing result of the arriving request: 
o “1” – all nested WSCAs are processed successfully; 
o “2” – several nested WSCAs were processed with failure but all of them were 
tolerated because of error handling inside the Component WS; 
o “3” – several nested WSCAs were processed with failure and despite the error 
handling not all of them were tolerated inside the Component WSs. However, the 
partially executed request was tolerated because of error handling of the Composite 
WS; 
o “4” – several (or all) nested WSCAs were processed with failure and despite the error 
handling not all of them were tolerated inside the Component WSs. Besides, the 
partially executed request was no tolerated despite the error handling mechanism of 
the Composite WS; 
● ReqStat – execution outcomes of processing an arriving request (IF ReqOut = {1,2,3} 
THEN ReqStat = 1 ELSE ReqStat =0):  
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o “1” – the request is executed successfully (includes the situation when failures 
occurred, but they were tolerated inside the Component WSs or by the 
Composite WS);  
o “0” – the request is executed with failures which were not tolerated. 
o ServLoad[1..ServCount] – array, which specifies the load time for each of the 
dedicated servers during the processing of an arriving request, in seconds. 
3.2.3. Input Data. Foundation of their Values 
The results, represented in the next part, were obtained by simulation of a travel agency (TA) 
web-service which takes into account the results stated in [Tartanoglu et al 2003]. The next 
input data and settings were accepted for the TA simulation:  
1. There are four types of Component WS (CnCount = 4): 
● CnWS1 – “Booking of through ticket”, that process WSCA1 – “Through ticket”; 
● CnWS2 – “Booking of back ticket”, that process WSCA2 – “Back ticket”; 
● CnWS3 – “Hotel reservation”, that process WSCA3 – “Hotel”; 
● CnWS4 – “Excursion order”, that process WSCA4 – “Excursion”. 
2. Because of error handling suppose that there are three possible outcomes for each of the 
composites:  
● PCnWS1 – probability that the Component WS1 processes WSCA1 without failure; 
● PCnWS2 – probability that the Component WS2 processes WSCA2 with a failure 
tolerated by the error handling of Component WS2; 
● PCnWS3 – probability that the Component WS3 processes WSCA3 with a failure not 
tolerated by the error handling of Component WS3. 
Suppose, that the probabilities of the different outcomes are defined for each type of 
Component WSs as follows: 
PCn1(CnWS1) = 0.5; PCn2(CnWS1) = 0.25; PCn3(CnWS1) = 0.25; 
PCn1(CnWS2) = 0.5; PCn2(CnWS2) = 0.25; PCn3(CnWS2) = 0.25; 
PCn1(CnWS3) = 0.5; PCn2(CnWS3) = 0.25; PCn3(CnWS3) = 0.25; 
PCn1(CnWS4) = 0.5; PComp2(C4) = 0.25; PComp3(C4) = 0.25. 
Thus, PCn = [0.5, 0.25, 0.25;  
           0.5, 0.25, 0.25;  
           0.5, 0.25, 0.25;  
           0.5, 0.25, 0.25]; 
3. Suppose that the normal (with no failure) execution time of each Component WS are as 
follows: 
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T(CnWS1) = 0.1 sec; T(CnWS2) = 0.1 sec; T(CnWS3) = 0.1 sec; T(CnWS4) = 0.1 sec. 
Thus, TCn = [0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1]; 
4. Suppose that there are seven types of requests, which arrive to the Composite WS:  
(ReqCount = 7): 
AR1 = {WSCA1}; R2 = {WSCA2}; AR3 = {WSCA1, WSCA2};  
AR4 = {WSCA1, WSCA3}; AR5 = {WSCA1, WSCA2, WSCA3};  
AR6 = {WSCA1, WSCA3, WSCA4}; AR7 = {WSCA1, WSCA2, WSCA3, WSCA4}. 
Thus, MReq = [1, 0, 0, 0;  
            0, 1, 0, 0;  
            1, 1, 0, 0;  
            1, 0, 1, 0; 
            1, 1, 1, 0; 
            1, 0, 1, 1; 
            1, 1, 1, 1]; 
5 Suppose that the probabilities of arrival of each type of requests are equal (1/ReqCount): 
Thus, PReq = [0.14286, 0.14286, 0.14286,  
            0.14286, 0.14286, 0.14286, 0.14286]; 
6 We explored several physical configuration of Composite Web Service with one, two, 
three and four dedicated servers. For example, for the three-servers configuration 
(Fig. 3.4) we supposed that: 
● ServCount = 3; 
● dedicated server DS1 serves the Composite WSs CnWS1 and CnWS2; 
● dedicated server DS2 serves the Composite WS CnWS3; 
● dedicated server DS3 serves the Composite WS CnWS4. 
Thus, MServ = [1, 1, 0, 0;  
             0, 0, 1, 0;  
             0, 0, 0, 1]; 
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Fig. 3.4. TA model (three-servers configuration) and partial simulation results
 
3.2.4. Simulation Results 
The results were obtained by averaging the simulation outcomes for 1000 arriving requests. 
These results were compared for the Composite WSs with and without the error handling 
mechanism under the assumption that this mechanism is capable of tolerating all detected 
faults.  
1. Simulation results for Composite WSs with error handling at the Component and 
Composite WSs levels  are shown in Fig. 3.5. 
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Mean request processing time equests 
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requests by 
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ServCount= 
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1 240 0,1614 0,1295 0,1229 0,1 
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2. Simulation results for Composite WSs without error handling  are given in Fig. 3.6. 
 
 
Fig. 3.6. Simulation results for a Composite WS without error handling 
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3. Fig.3.7 shows the comparison of the number and the request processing times of 
successful and unsuccessful requests for Composite WSs with and without error 
handling. 
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 Fig.3.7
 Different request outcomes for composite web services 
with and without error handling
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. Comparison of the number and request processing times for a Composite WS with 
and without error handling 
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3.2.5. Discussion 
As follows from the analysis above, the composition of WSs and the use of exceptions 
handling allow us to significantly increase the ratio of the successfully serviced requests. At 
the same time, there is an increase of the mean time of request processing. However, using 
more then one dedicated servers makes it possible to essentially decrease this time as Fig. 3.7 
clearly indicates. We can conclude, therefore, that the performance of the Composite WSs 
depends significantly on the hardware architecture and as the level of concurrency increases 
the negative impact of the overhead due to exception handling decreases. 
The results reported here have been obtained under the assumption that the confidence 
intervals of the initial values used in the simulation and the settings may be determined using 
data from the previous experience or trustworthy prediction methods. 
By changing parameters used in the particular simulation setup (e.g. varying the values of the 
times used and probabilities of the various events involved) we can analyse whether the 
observed effects depend on the values of the parameters or not. For instance, for a wide range 
of parameters the negative impact of exception handling on the performance is observed (see 
Fig. 3.7), in these cases extensive concurrency of WSs with exception handling can be 
recommended. 
Note, that the analysis above ignores the additional cost caused by the increased level of 
concurrency. Although it is clear that in some application-specific situations, there will be no 
additional cost. It is in our future plan to work on a refined model dealing with this issue. 
4. On Dependability of Composite Web Services with Components 
Upgraded Online 
4.1. Upgrading problem of Composite Web Services  
The problem of dealing with online system upgrades is well known and a number of solutions 
have been proposed (see, for example [Romanovsky et al 2002]). The main reasons for 
upgrading systems are improving/adding functionality or correction of bugs. The difficulties 
in dealing with upgrades of COTS components in a dependable way are well recognised and 
a number of solutions have been proposed.  
The WS architecture poses a new set of problems manly caused by its openness and by the 
fact that the component WSs are executed in different management domains and are outside 
of the control of the composite WS. Moreover, switching such systems off or inflicting any 
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serious interruptions in the service they provide is not acceptable, so all upgrades have to be 
dealt with seamlessly and online. 
Suppose we construct a Composite Web Service which depends on WSs provided by third 
parties, as shown in Fig. 4.1. 
Composite WS 
URL:My Node
Composite 
Web-Service
URL:Node 1 
Web-Service 1
WS1
WS 2
URL:Node 2 
Web-Service 2
All Web-Services are published with their interfaces 
respective  according WSDL. 
The Composite Web-Service uses Web-Service 1  
and Web-Service2 
 
Fig. 4.1. A Deployment diagram of a Composite Web Service which depends on two other 
Web Services provided by third parties, Web Service 1 and Web Service 2, accordingly 
The fact that the Composite WS depends on third-party services poses a problem, which is 
well-known for any component-based software development with off-the-shelf (OTS) 
components. When a new release of an OTS component is made available the system 
integrator has two options: 
● they change their ‘integrated’ solution4 to use the new release of the OTS component. 
This may cause problems for the integrated solution and may require significant effort to 
rectify.  
● they stick to the old version of the OTS component but risk to face the consequences if 
the vendor of the OTS component ceases to support the old releases of the OTS 
component. 
The choice between these two options is available to the integrator. Each of the options has 
its pros and cons. In many cases the integrator would take the first option even though no 
immediate problems have been observed to originate from the old OTS component. Almost 
                                                 
4 A term which I picked up at ECUA: http://www.esi.es/en/Projects/ecua/ecua.htm  
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always such ‘lock-in’ with a particular vendor is dictated by the need for support of the OTS 
component by the vendor.  
The situation with a Composite Web-Service can be seen as very similar with the one with 
any other OTS software component. Indeed the Web-Service 1 and Web-service 2 in Fig. 4.1 
are two components integrated in the Composite Web-Service; conceptually this is 
equivalent to integrating any other OTS software component in an integrated solution. There 
may, however, a difference from the point of view of maintenance of the Composite Web-
Service compared with the maintenance of the integrated solution. In the latter case, as 
indicated above, the integrator has a choice whether to update the integrated solution with 
every new release of the OTS components or not. Such a choice may not exist in the former 
case of Composite Web-services. The deployment of a Composite Web-Service assumes that 
the Web-Services used by the composite service (Web-Service 1 and Web-Service 2 in our 
example in Fig. 4.1) have been deployed by their respective providers. If the providers decide 
to, bring down their services the composite service may become unavailable, too. What 
seems more interesting is that when the provider of a service on which the composite service 
depends decides to update their service the provider of the composite service may not be 
even notified about the update. The composite service may be affected without its provider 
being able to do anything to prevent this from happening. Thus the provider of the Composite 
WS is automatically locked-in by the very decision to depend on another WS.  
Are there ways out of the lock-in? If not, can the provider of the Composite WS do 
something at least to make the users of the composite service they offer aware of the 
potential problems as a result of the update(s) beyond their control? Here we discuss two 
plausible alternatives: 1) Several releases of the same WS are operational; 2) Only the latest 
release of a WS is operational. More detail description of the different solutions to solve the 
problem of Web Services online upgrading presented in [Kharchenko et al 2004]. 
4.2. First Upgrading Mode: Several Releases of the Same WS are Operational  
This scenario is depicted in Fig. 4.2. The choice of whether to switch to a new release of a 
WS used by the composite service is returned back to the provider of the Composite WS.  
The provider of the composite service may use whatever methods are available to them to 
assess the ‘quality’ of the new release before deciding whether or not to move to the 
upgraded version(s) of the used WS.  
 28
Composite WS
URL:My Node
Composite Web-Servic
WS 2
URL:Node 2
Web-Service 2
WS1.1
WS1.0
URL:Node 1
Web-Service 1.
Web-Service 1.0
 
a) 
URL:Node 2 
Web-Service 2 
WS 2
Composite WS 
URL:My Node
Composite 
Web-Service 
WS1.1
URL:Node 1 
Web-Service 1.1
Web-Service 1.0 
WS1.0
 
b) 
Fig. 4.2. A new release, v.1.1, of a composite service (Web-Service 1) is released, but the old 
version is also kept operational. The new release has no effect on the composite services 
which depend on the previous release, 2a). Eventually, the composite service is ‘upgraded’ 
and now it uses the newer version of Web-Service 1.1. 
The designer of the composite service may even make provisions at design stage of the 
Composite WS which facilitates the assessment of the new releases of the services the 
composite service depends on when these become available. An example of such design 
would be making it possible to run ‘back-to-back’ the old and the new releases of the WS 
used in the composite service. During the transitional period (when the new release WS 1.1 
becomes available) the old version will continue to be the version used by the Composite 
WS, but by comparing the results coming from the old and the new release, WS 1.0 and 
WS 1.1 respectively, the provider of the Composite WS will gain empirical evidence which 
will help to build confidence that the new release, WS 1.1, is of adequate quality.  
Designs which allow for co-existence of several releases and, thus facilitate the transition 
from an older to a newer version, have been used in the past. An example is the architecture 
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of Clustra SQL server [Torbjornsen 1995], now acquired by Sun. One of the main qualities 
emphasised by the developers of Clustra, possible as a result of allowing several versions of 
the server to run concurrently (dynamically added and taken off the cluster) is the extremely 
high availability which this design allows to achieve.  
Building confidence about the quality of the new release of a WS can be formalised. We 
have reported elsewhere in a different context how Bayesian inference can be used to assess 
the reliability of a fault-tolerant software [Littlewood et al 2000]. The same approach is 
directly applicable in the new context of WSs. 
Dynamically updating the confidence in the quality of the WS (both of an old or new release) 
may be a useful parameter which can be made known to the users of the WS. Specifying the 
confidence in the quality of the service statically, i.e. in the description of the service 
(according to WSDL), or making it available on demand (as one of the operations published 
through the WS’s interface), may be useful to the users of the service or providers of the 
composite services when they assess the risk of using the particular WS or merely as a factor 
affecting the cost for a service (the higher the assurance provided the higher the cost). 
4.3. Second Upgrading Mode: Only the Latest Release of a WS is Operational  
Under this scenario Fig. 4.2b is automatically arrived at with every new release of WS 1. The 
options left to the provider of the composite service are very limited. Yet, publishing the 
release of the WS (in the example above 1.0 will be replaced by 1.1) can be used by the 
provider of the composite service to ‘adjust’ the confidence that the provider of the 
composite service can ‘declare’ to its user. A conservative view would be to reduce the 
confidence in the quality of the service every time a new release is made available compared 
with the confidence achieved with the old release of the WS 1. A discussion of how the 
confidence issue can be treated has been presented elsewhere, [Popov 2002]. Although the 
discussion was given for a different context of safety-critical systems (in which dependability 
requirements are normally stated explicitly in quantitative terms) the approach of assessing 
the confidence in quality (i.e. probability of failure on demand) is applicable for WS without 
any modifications. This may achieve the goal of making the users of the WS aware of what 
quality of a WS its ‘honest’ provider is able to ‘claim’. 
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5. Directions of Dependable Web Services Development  
5.1. Composing Dependable Web Services Out of Undependable Components  
One of the important conclusions we have reached while working on this report is that, 
paraphrasing the famous statement of von Neumann’s about building “reliable units out of 
unreliable elements (schemes)”, the general aim of current work in WSs should be building 
“dependable Composite Web Services out of undependable Web Components”.  
5.2. Measures and Metrics of Web Services and Components 
Dependability of WSs can by measured by various parameters and metrics. In case of 
Composite WSs, we can measure both the Component WSs and the Composite WS as a 
whole, taking into account the system architecture. Besides, using metrics divided into 
several subsets for assessment of different dependability sub-characteristics, such as 
functionality, reliability, security, etc. In this case, the two main problems to be solved are: 
1) the problem of trustworthy collection of initial data for measurement; 
2) the problem of representation of the measurements results, their analysis and 
interpretation. 
Using standard and specially developed tools for monitoring Web Services can solve the first 
problem. Solving the second problem can be based on applying of radial metrics diagrams 
(RMD), which is an analogue of the kiviat-diagrams, and a set of special operations on 
external and internal RMD’s transformation (RMD’s building an hierarchy, convolution, 
modification, etc), proposed in [Kharchenko et al 2003].  
Examples of using RMDs  for Composite Web services dependability assessment is shown in 
Fig. 5.1. There are two possible variants of convolution of Component WSs RMDs. The first 
variant is a component convolution (left-hand part of Fig.5.1) for which the dependability 
attributes of every Component WS are convoluted into component RMD of Composite Web 
Services. In the second variant (right-hand part of Fig.5.1) the dependability attributes of 
every Component WS are convoluted into dependability attributes RMD of the Composite 
Web Services.  
5.3. Diversity as a Means of Improving Dependability of Web Services 
Diversity as a means of improving dependability of Web Services may be applied on 
different levels of the structured model and in different forms. There may be horizontal and 
vertical diversity at the levels of Composite Web Services. Besides, there may be different 
kinds of diversity of WS components at the nested level. 
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Fig. 5.1. RMD application for Composite WS dependability assessment  
5.4. Adaptive Web Services  
Improved flexibility and dependability of Web Services can be reached by using dynamic 
monitoring, assessment, correction of the composite service, configuration of the components 
and services according to the various parameters of environment, such as the user region, day 
& night requests rate variation, psychology of waiting etc. These parameters must be taken 
into consideration for changing the operation of the Web service. For example, with respect 
to the request rate variation we can provide more reliable or faster request processing. 
5.5. Categorization of Requests and Procedures of their Accounting 
One of the attractive features that can be added to the Web Services is the request 
categorisation. It will allow a necessary quality of service to be provided. To do this all user's 
requests will be categorised by the required level of reliability, security, priority, etc. The 
request category, guarantee and payment will have to be defined before the user and the Web 
Service enter into service agreement.  
5.6. Structured Approach 
The proposed structured approach to the Composite Web Services development implies both 
“vertical” and “horizontal” structuring (Fig.5.2). Horizontal structuring is proposed in order 
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to fragment the universal Component WSs into several specialised services. It can take place, 
for example, at creation of the global travel Web Service by integration the services provided 
by several travel agencies, placed in different regions of the world. It can provide the 
complex service “round-the-world travel”.  
At the large quantity of the Web Components, it is necessary to solve a problem of 
optimization of a number of the service vertical levels (i.e. vertical structuring). Besides 
vertical structuring can be used for decentralisation of the control flow and decomposition of 
the service functionality, for example, to create such services chain: “recreation” –> “kinds 
of recreation” –> “tourism” –> “kinds of tourism” –> “mountaneering” etc.  
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Fig.5.2. “Vertical” and “horizontal” structuring  
on Composite Web Services development 
Horizontal and vertical structuring also provide flexibility of the Composite Web Service and 
simplicity of the Component WSs implementation. If it is necessary to change or modify 
several Component WSs we can easily do it without significant change of the whole Web 
Service. Besides, the horizontal structuring allows to reduce the request processing time due 
to the parallel processing, when the vertical structuring can provide it due to the local 
servicing in the intermediate Composite WSs if global servicing did not require 
(see Fig.5.2.). 
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Conclusions and Future Work 
We are planning to continue our work in the following three directions: theoretical, 
simulation and practical experiments with WSs. 
Firstly, further theoretical works is required to address: 
● Development of a taxonomy of the faults of WSs stipulated by different causes. The 
taxonomy may be based on faults classification described in [Avizienis et al 2002] taking 
into consideration both the specificity of the WSs as a whole and the features of the 
possible failures connected with the upgrading of the Web-components. It’s necessary to 
underline that the taxonomy of the WS fault must be considered according to concepts of 
Web-services dependability; 
● Selection of measures (metrics) to assess WSs dependability as a whole and their old and 
new components. For this the technique, based on the analysis of the assumptions and on 
the radial metrics diagrams convolution, may be used [Kharchenko et al 2003]; 
● Development of models of WSs dependability. In particular, obtaining and processing 
trustworthy dependability-related information is very important. The choice of the 
Component WSs and the architecture of the most reliable Composite WS will depend on 
the accuracy of the measurements and the correctness of the made assumptions, both of 
which will be imperfect and subject to some level of uncertainty.  
● Development of methods and techniques to ensure WSs dependability which take into 
account the additional risks caused by WSs upgrading, security and other factors. The 
problem of dependability assurance of the WSs as a whole was formulated above as the 
problem of development of dependable WSs out of undependable Web-components.  
Secondly, the simulation works will be continued to address: 
● Extend the simulation modeling to cover a wide range of model parameters and 
architectures plausible for WSs and measure various aspects of WSs dependability; 
● Simulation of more complex scenarios in which adaptive mechanisms will be deployed 
for adjusting the architecture of the Composite WS to new releases of Component WS 
services. Adjustment of the monitoring techniques to perfect the control procedures. To 
rise trustworthiness of results may be used several diverse techniques based on so-called 
multiversion approach to assessment [Kharchenko 1999].  
Thirdly, experimental works with WSs will be connected with decision on the following 
tasks:  
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● Detailed development of Composite Web-services architectures of different solutions 
described and discussed in sections 3-5. The design of software supporting WSs 
performance with several upgrading components; 
● Implementation of proposed technique for different applications (e-commerce, banking, 
travel agencies, etc); 
● Development of upgrading WSs management technique. 
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